The Contract with Missing Signatures

Seneca Falls, 1848, and the demand to be counted among “the people”

On a humid July morning in upstate New York, five women poured tea in a parlor and quietly rewrote political philosophy. Jane Hunt had invited Lucretia Mott, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Martha Coffin Wright, and Mary Ann M’Clintock for what looked like a genteel visit. By the time the cups cooled, they’d planned a two‑day meeting in a nearby chapel to ask a question the age had politely avoided: If government rests on the consent of the governed, how can half the governed never give consent at all? Within days, a terse notice summoned townspeople to the Wesleyan Chapel at Seneca Falls. The benches creaked, the air was sweltering, and the first women’s rights convention opened—less a rally than a renegotiation of the social contract itself.1

If Social Contract theory often arrives to us in the voice of solitary men, Seneca Falls answered in a chorus. The most audacious line came from a woman sometimes seen in a plain bonnet, sometimes with a pen behind her ear: Elizabeth Cady Stanton—the reformer who rewrote Jefferson in a parlor. With M’Clintock’s help, she drafted a “Declaration of Sentiments,” modeled on 1776 but aimed at the legal and moral architecture that rendered married women civilly invisible under coverture. It began with a sentence that still jolts: “We hold these truths to be self‑evident: that all men and women are created equal.”2 The point wasn’t literary mimicry; it was jurisdictional. Stanton brought women within the “we” of American sovereignty.

Here’s the big idea in plain terms: a social contract that claims everyone’s allegiance but withholds voice and legal standing is a contract of adhesion—fine print forced on the party with least power. Think of the polity as a house with shared walls: if women can’t hold property independently, enter professions freely, or vote for the rules that govern the house, then they’re paying the mortgage without a key. Coverture made this literal; the law merged a wife’s legal identity into her husband’s, dissolving her capacity to own, sue, or contract. Even reforms like New York’s 1848 Married Women’s Property Act—passed the same year as the convention—were partial repairs, not a new blueprint.35

Seneca Falls staged the stress test. Resolutions on education, property rights, and religious equality drew warm assent. But when Stanton introduced the demand for the elective franchise, murmurs turned to open hesitation—even among allies. Suffrage felt, to many, a bridge too far, likely to sink the rest. Then Frederick Douglass rose. A veteran of anti‑slavery platforms and editor of The North Star, he argued that rights were interlocked: citizenship without a ballot is dependence by another name. Persuasion tipped the room; the suffrage resolution passed by a thin but historic margin.14 The press promptly ridiculed the convention, and some signers later withdrew under the glare—but the controversy functioned like an amplifier, spreading the words they’d meant only to announce.

What makes this more than movement history is the way it reframes legitimacy. Social contract theorists from Hobbes to Locke to Rousseau debated the origins of authority: fear, consent, the general will. Seneca Falls moved the hinge from theory to membership. The question was not only “Why obey?” but “Who counts when we say ‘we’?” If the governed cannot testify in court independently, keep their wages, or cast a vote, then consent is a polite fiction. By recasting grievances as breaches of contract—political, civil, religious—the Declaration supplied an audit trail: here are the clauses where the promise broke.2

You can track the aftershocks. A national series of women’s rights conventions followed; property reforms crept forward; the movement fractured over strategy and race after the Civil War; and only in 1920 did the Nineteenth Amendment secure women’s suffrage nationwide. The arc is untidy, and that’s the point: contracts are negotiated in drafts, with erasures and addenda, not by a single stroke of genius.

So what do we do with Seneca Falls today? Use it as a diagnostic tool: the Inclusion Test for any “we the people.”

You can apply this beyond ballots. Consider whose labor sustains the economy but is unpaid or undercounted—caregivers and domestic workers. Consider communities most surveilled by public safety technologies yet least represented in deciding how those tools are used. Consider students governed by campus policies without meaningful student voice, or residents taxed in territories without federal representation. The specifics vary, but the test holds: if the governed cannot say “no,” their “yes” is suspect.

Seneca Falls does not tell us that every demand will be popular, or that ridicule means you’re right. It teaches a subtler lesson: legitimacy is not a metaphysical glow around institutions; it is a ledger of who gets to speak, sign, and be seen as a legal person. In 1848, a handful of neighbors carried that ledger into a chapel and wrote themselves in. The social contract became legible not as a myth about the past, but as a living document that can be amended—provided those who live under it get a pen.


  1. Seneca Falls Convention, overview and proceedings

  2. Declaration of Sentiments, text and context

  3. Married Women’s Property Act (New York, 1848)

  4. Frederick Douglass’s role at Seneca Falls and The North Star

  5. Coverture in Anglo‑American law